SPS. JESUS AND EMER FAJARDO vs. ANITA R. FLORES G.R. No. 167891 January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.:

Facts: Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land located in Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the two until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. From the time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land, which is the subject of controversy.

On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as “KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG followed by another agreement, “KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA,” executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. The case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.

On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351, was agricultural land; that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute between the parties, regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore precluded the MTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case.

Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first glance, the court did not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that it was admitted that petitioner was allowed to cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan, however, revealed that what was divided was only the portion being tilled. By contrast, the subject matter of the complaint was the stony portion where petitioners’ house was erected. Thus, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter. On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decision in toto upon a finding that no reversible error was committed by the court a quo in its Decision dated August 29, 2002. On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order on December 10, 2002, reversing its decision dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found that the issue involved appeared to be an agrarian dispute, which fell within the contemplation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.

A petition for review was then filed by respondents with the CA to annul the Order of the RTC dated December 10, 2002. On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision, which reinstated the MTC decision. It disagreed with the findings of the RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners’ house stood was stony and residential in nature, one that may not be made to fall within the ambit of the operation of Philippine agrarian laws, owing to its non-agriculture character. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated December 10, 2002 that the resolution of this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the parties. The issue of who has a better right of possession over the subject land cannot be determined without resolving first the matter as to whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.

Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the tenancy relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.

Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, regarding the interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to the DAR, which in turn referred the case to the DARAB. In view of the foregoing, we reiterate Hilario v. Prudente, that:

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

SPS. CARMEN and JOSE TONGSON vs. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA, INC. G.R. No. 167874 January 15, 2010 Carpio J.:

Facts: In may 1992, Napala offered to purchase from the spouses Tongson their 364-square meter parcel of land, situated in Davao City for P3,000,000.00. The spouses found the offer acceptable and executed with Napala a Memorandum of Agreement on May 8, 1992. Upong signing the Deed of Absolute Sale, Napala paid the spouses P200,000.00 in cash and issued a post-dated check in the amount of P2,800,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price of the subject property. When presented for payment, the PNB check was dishonored for insufficient funds. Despite the spouses Tongson’s repeated demands to either pay the full value of the check or to return the land, Napala failed to do either. The spouses filed with the RTC of Davao City a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Damages with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

The trial court found that the purchase price of the subject property has not been fully paid and that Napala’s assurance to the Spouses Tongson that the PNB check would not bounce constituted fraud that induced the Spouses Tongson to enter into the sale. Without such assurance, the Spouses Tongson would not have agreed to the contract of sale. Accordingly, there was fraud within the ambit of Article 1338 of the Civil Code, justifying the annulment of the contract of sale, the award of damages and attorney’s fees, and payment of costs. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s finding that Napala employed fraud when he misrepresented to the Spouses Tongson that the PNB check in the amount of P2,800,000 would be properly funded at its maturity. However, the Court of Appeals found that the issuance and delivery of the PNB check and fraudulent representation made by Napala could not be considered as the determining cause for the sale of the subject parcel of land. Hence, such fraud could not be made the basis for annulling the contract of sale. Nevertheless, the fraud employed by Napala is a proper and valid basis for the entitlement of the Spouses Tongson to the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P2,800,000 plus interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint on 11 February 1993.

The Spouses Tongson filed a partial motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 10 March 2005. Hence, this petition for review before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the contract of sale can be annulled based on the fraud employed by Napala.

Held: The petition has merit.

A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons, whereby one is bound to give something or to render some service to the other. A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.

Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente), inducement to the making of the contract. Additionally, the fraud must be serious.

We find no causal fraud in this case to justify the annulment of the contract of sale between the parties. It is clear from the records that the Spouses Tongson agreed to sell their 364-square meter Davao property to Napala who offered to pay P3,000,000 as purchase price therefor. Contrary to the Spouses Tongson’s belief that the fraud employed by Napala was “already operational at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale,” the misrepresentation by Napala that the postdated PNB check would not bounce on its maturity hardly equates to dolo causante. Napala’s assurance that the check he issued was fully funded was not the principal inducement for the Spouses Tongson to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Even before Napala issued the check, the parties had already consented and agreed to the sale transaction. The Spouses Tongson were never tricked into selling their property to Napala. On the contrary, they willingly accepted Napala’s offer to purchase the property at P3,000,000. In short, there was a meeting of the minds as to the object of the sale as well as the consideration therefor.

Some of the instances where this Court found the existence of causal fraud include: (1) when the seller, who had no intention to part with her property, was “tricked into believing” that what she signed were papers pertinent to her application for the reconstitution of her burned certificate of title, not a deed of sale; (2) when the signature of the authorized corporate officer was forged; or (3) when the seller was seriously ill, and died a week after signing the deed of sale raising doubts on whether the seller could have read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of the consequences of his act. Suffice it to state that nothing analogous to these badges of causal fraud exists in this case.

While they did not file an action for the rescission of the sales contract, the Spouses Tongson specifically prayed in their complaint for the annulment of the sales contract, for the immediate execution of a deed of reconveyance, and for the return of the subject property to them. The Spouses Tongson likewise prayed “for such other reliefs which may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.” In view of such prayer, and considering respondents’ substantial breach of their obligation under the sales contract, the rescission of the sales contract is but proper and justified. Accordingly, respondents must reconvey the subject property to the Spouses Tongson, who in turn shall refund the initial payment of P200,000 less the costs of suit.

TORRES vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010 Peralta, J.:

Facts: On August 27, 1986, petitioner Jaime T. Torres, as owner of St. James School, and respondent China Banking Corporation executed a mortgage agreement over parcels of land to secure petitioner’s loan in the amount of P4,600,000.00 evidenced by a Promissory Note dated August 22, 1986, which stated that the “loan was repayable within a period of five years with interest, payable monthly in arrears at 20 percent per annum commencing on September 22, 1986 until fully paid.” Thereafter, petitioner requested the restructuring of the loan.
On November 29, 1988 and February 20, 1989, respondent sent petitioner demand letters to settle his overdue account of P4,600,000.00, exclusive of interest and penalties, rendering the obligation due and demandable; otherwise, respondent would extrajudicially foreclose the real estate mortgage.

In a letter dated February 20, 1989, respondent’s Senior Vice-President informed petitioner that his partial payments of P200,000.00 and P654,465.75 made on October 6, 1988 and October 28, 1988, respectively, were applied to the interest on the loan.
On May 25, 1989, petitioner tendered another payment in the amount of P2,000,000.00, together with a letter stating that the amount was to update payment of petitioner’s restructured account, and the excess amount to be applied to the principal balance, under Official Receipt No. 59845. Another payment was made on June 1, 1989 for P1,000,000.00 under Official Receipt No. 60084.

On June 6, 1989, respondent formally notified petitioner that since the latter refused to submit to the former the request for postponement of the auction sale of the property, scheduled on June 7, 1989, respondent would proceed with the auction sale. the following day, respondent caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of the mortgaged properties. The Clerk od Court and the Ex Officio Sheriff of pasig sold the properties to respondent as the highest bidder. On November 3, 1989, petitioner filed an action for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure sale against respondent for the alleged illegal foreclosure of mortgage over the parcels of land and the subsequent sale of the properties.

Respondent stated that [petitioner had no valid cause of action against it, since petitioner failed to pay his obligation in accordance with the terms of the promissory note, which rendered the entire principal of the promissory note due and demandable. Instead of paying the same, petitioner formally requested respondent to restructure the subject loan. Respondent required petitioner to pay all past due interests and quarterly installments before loan restructuring could be discussed. However, respondent accepted the check payment of P2,000,000.00, which was applied to petitioner’s loan interest up to January 14, 1988. Respondent stated that in the letter dated February 20, 1989, it formally informed petitioner that it never agreed to the restructuring of the loan for P4,600,000.00. Respondent also claimed that in its last letter dated February 28, 1989, it reiterated its position that the promissory note was due and demandable, and extrajudicial foreclosure would push through if full payment was not made within seven days. Respondent asserted that the foreclosure proceedings were conducted in accordance with the requirements of Act 3115, as amended.

On May 30, 1990, petitioner tendered payment in the amount of P2,756,487.77 as redemption price of the foreclosed property.[11] Respondent protested the tender of payment, maintaining that Section 78 of the General Banking Act applied in this case, not Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; hence, the redemption price due as of May 30, 1990 should be P2,993,219.41, resulting in a deficient payment by petitioner in the sum of P236,731.64.

On September 29, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It held that respondent acted in bad faith and deceit in foreclosing the subject properties after the offer for restructuring by petitioner, together with substantial payments made.

Respondent appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found respondent’s appeal to be partly meritorious. It disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the foreclosure sale was null and void, because the trial court’s conclusion that the foreclosure was premature and attended by bad faith was not supported by the facts of the case and the law on the matter. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the redemption price should be P2,993,219.41, which was petitioner’s outstanding balance as of May 30, 1990 after deducting his total payments amounting to P3,854,465.75. It also agreed with respondent that the applicable law was Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337, otherwise known as the General Banking Act, and not Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner, through his counsel of record, Atty. Salvador B. Britanico, filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On November 5, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution,[21]which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The Resolution became final and executory and an Entry of Judgment was issued on November 30, 2001.

On July 10, 2002, almost eight months after the Entry of Judgment, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner. However, the records of the case did not show that petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Britanico of the S.B. Britanico Lisaca Lisaca Apelado Law Offices, had withdrawn from the case.

On March 19, 2003, petitioner, through Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment and to Resolve Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration had yet to be resolved. In a Resolution dated September 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration had already been resolved.

2. Whether or not the entry of judgment issued by the CA is premature, considering that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration has not yet been resolved despite announcement of the CA that it had already resolved said Motion.

Held: The petition lacks merit.

1. The Court of Appeals resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated November 5, 2001. The Resolution was properly served on petitioner’s counsel of record on November 14, 2001. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Fifteen days from receipt of the Resolution dated November 5, 2001, the Decision became final and executory absent any appeal by petitioner. Hence, the Entry of Judgment issued on November 30, 2001 was in order.

2. Based on the records of the case, the Resolution dated November 5, 2001, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 23, 2001, was received by petitioner’s counsel on November 14, 2001. Petitioner failed to appeal the Court of Appeals’ Decision to this Court.

The failure to file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is not a denial of due process. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Further, the proper remedy for allegations of mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel, which prevented a party from taking an appeal, is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered. It must be filed within the reglementary period, which is reckoned from the time the party’s counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party.

Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory and Entry of Judgment was issued on November 30, 2001, the Decision can no longer be reviewed by this Court.

SAMUEL U. LEE vs. KBC BANK, N.V.

SAMUEL U. LEE vs. KBC BANK, N.V.
G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010

Carpio, J.:

Facts: idas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a $1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank), a Belgian corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer and director of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 issued by Otto Versand, a company based in Germany, and covered a shipment of girl’s basic denim jeans amounting to $1,863,050 to KBC Bank. MDEC obtained another loan, amounting to $65,000, from KBC Bank. Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and assistant secretary of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. WC-128 issued by Otto Versand, and covered a shipment of boy’s bermuda jeans amounting to $841,500 to KBC Bank.
MDEC was considered in default in paying the $65,000 loan on 30 January 1998. KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of Confirmed Purchase Order Nos. MTC-548 and WC-128. Otto Versand sent a facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that (1) it did not issue the purchase orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items covered by the purchase orders, and (3) it would not pay MDEC any amount.

In a complaint-affidavit, Liza M. Pajarillo, manager of the corporate division of KBC Bank, charged Lee and Lim of estafa. In his Resolution, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia (State Prosecutor Subia) found the existence of probable cause and recommended that two counts of estafa be filed against Lee and Lim. Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim were filed with the RTC. After finding probable cause, Judge Winlove M. Dumayas (Judge Dumayas) of the RTC issued warrants of arrest against Lee and Lim. Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice. In his Resolution, Secretary Hernando B. Perez (Secretary Perez) directed the withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim. Secretary Perez held that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence. KBC Bank filed a motion for reconsideration with the Department of Justice. In a motion filed with the RTC, Assistant City Prosecutor Nora C. Sibucao (Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao) prayed for the withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim. Judge Dumayas granted Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao’s motion to withdraw the informations against Lee and Lim. KBC Bank filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution, the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. In his Resolution Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong denied KBC Bank’s 2 August 2002 motion for reconsideration. In its 10 February 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003 Order holding that the Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. Hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court did not abdicate its duty to determine the sufficiency of the prosecution’s reason for withdrawing the informations.

Held: Court is not impressed. Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and whether the element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation.

Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor, which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.

Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case violates KBC Bank’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Dumayas’ order granting the Motion to Withdraw the informations is void.

AGDEPPA vs. HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE

AGDEPPA vs. HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE
G.R. No. 164436, January 15, 2010

Nachura, J.:

Facts: In 1979, respondent Dorotea Bonete, widow of the late Igancio Bonete, obtained a loan in the amount of P55,000.00 from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)in order to buy farm implements. The loan was secured by a parcel of agricultural land. In 1982, Dorotea received a notice of collection from DBP. Respondents alleged that herein petitioner and counsel, Atty. Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa (Littie Sarah) accompanied Dorotea to DBP and obligated herself to pay the loan. Thereafter, Dorotea was made to sign a document as Little Sarah’s security for the amount which the latter paid to DBP in connection with the said loan. Since 1982, Littie Sarah and her representatives had been gradually easing them out of the subject property and that they were ordered to stop the cultivation of their respective ricefields. Eventually, respondents were forcibly ejected from the subject property.

On this account, respondents inquired from the Register of Deeds and found that the title to the subject property, which was in the name of respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, the late Ignacio Bonete, had already been canceled and transferred to Littie Sarah under TCT No. T-75454 by virtue of a purported deed of sale. According to Dorotea, Littie Sarah took advantage of her by letting her sign a contract, ostensibly as security for the loan from DBP, which later turned out to be a deed of sale. Thus, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession and/or Annulment of Deed of Sale of the Subject Property before the RTC. Littie Sarah filed a Motion to Dismiss. Respondents filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 21, 1990, the RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint and held that respondents were not real parties in interest and lacked the personality to sue. Respondents went to the CA which reversed and set aside the RTC Order, and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings because Dorotea, being the former owner of the subject property, was a real party in interest. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents are real party in interest.

Held: While it is true that respondents committed a procedural infraction before the RTC, such infraction does not justify the dismissal of the case. Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.

It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property, was issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by the record, and petitioners themselves admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-75454, allegedly issued in favor of Littie Sarah, and the purported deed of sale, allegedly executed by Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not on record. Considering the allegations in the pleadings, it is best that a trial on the merits be conducted.

A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations involving excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not subvert the essence of the proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn adherence to procedure would result in the sacrifice of substantial justice for technicality. To deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims over the subject property on the strength of sheer technicality would be a travesty of justice and equity.

SPS. PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES vs. HEIRS OF JULIAN SAMBAAN

SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES vs. HEIRS OF JULIAN SAMBAAN
G.R.No. 163271, January 15, 2010

Del Castillo, J.:

Facts: Spouses Julian and Guillerma Sambaan were the registered owner of a property located in Bulua, Cagayan de oro City. The respondents and the petitioner Myrna Bernales are the children of Julian and Guillerma. Myrna, who is the eldest of the siblings, is the present owner and possessor of the property in question.

Julian died in an ambush in 1975. Before he died, he requested that the property in question be redeemed from Myrna and her husband Patricio Bernales. Thus, in 1982 one of Julian’s siblings offered to redeem the property but the petitioners refused because they were allegedly using the property as tethering place for their cattle.

In January 1991, respondents received an information that the subject property was already transferred to Myrna Bernales. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 bore the forged signatures of their parents, Julian and Guillerma.

On April 1993, the respondents, together with their mother Guillerma, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and cancellation of TCT No. T-14204 alleging that their parent’s signatures were forged. The trial court rendered a decision on August 2, 2001 cancelling the TCT and ordering another title to be issued in the name of the late Julian Sambaan.

Petitioners went to the CA and appealed the decision. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. A motion for reconsideration of the decision was, likewise, denied in 2004. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is authentic as to prove the ownership of the petitioners over the subject property.

Held: It is a question of fact rather than of law. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. But to erase any doubt on the correctness of the assailed ruling, we have carefully perused the records and, nonetheless, arrived at the same conclusion. We find that there is substantial evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial court’s conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged.

Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court.

Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property.