UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE G.R.No. 176831 January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.:

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Held: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

WELFREDO CENEZE vs. FELICIANA RAMOS G.R. No. 172287 January 15, 2010 Nachura, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Feliciana Ramos located in Lelemaan, Manaoag, Pangasinan. Petitioner alleged that in 1981, Julian Ceneze Sr., petitioner’s father, transferred his tenurial rights over the landholding to him with the consent and approval of respondent and that, since then, petitioner had been in actual and peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent forcibly entered and cultivated the land for the purpose of dispossessing the petitioner of his right as tenant.

Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed between her and petitioner, asserting that she had never instituted petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner had never been in possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was the tenant of the landholding. After Julian Sr., his wife and his son Julian Jr. migrated to the U.S.A. she reported on April 8, 1991, to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Manaoag, Pangasinan, the abandonment of the landholding by Julian, Sr., his wife and his son, Julian, Jr.

On December 19, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner for it find the petitioner a bona fide tenant-lessee of the landholding. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the decision.

Respondent elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review. On December 29, 2005, the CA resolved the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. Likewise, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review was filed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner had tenancy relationship with respondent.

Held: The petition is not meritorious.

In resolving this petition, the Court is guided by the principle that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land; it is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. The absence of one element does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant.

The certification or findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized representative) concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional in character; hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.

From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find that petitioner failed to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondent. To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a From our own assessment of the evidence at hand, we find that petitioner failed to establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between him and respondent. To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do not show that the elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present.

In any case, the fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise to a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for respondent’s share in the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of harvest.

To recap, petitioner is not a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure. There being no tenancy relationship between the parties, the DARAB did not have jurisdiction over the case. We, therefore, sustain the ruling of the CA, dismissing petitioner’s complaint.

CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS G.R.No. 168970 January 15, 2010 Peralta, J.:

Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.

Held: The court is not persuaded.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.